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Abstract
Testing the reaction of the primary surplus to variations in public debt, relative
to GDP respectively, has been frequently resorted to in order to test for sustainabil-
ity of a given debt policy. In this contribution, we analyze theoretically under which
condition a positive reaction of the primary surplus to variations in debt implies
a sustainable debt policy. We demonstrate that the evolution of the debt to GDP
ratio plays a decisive role as concerns the validity of the test outcome. In addition,
we demonstrate that a positive reaction coefficient does not guarantee sustainability
unless it exceeds at least the difference between the interest rate on public debt and
the GDP growth grate. Thus, this test allows judgements about sustainability of
public debt policies only if the interest rate and the GDP growth rate are known.
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1 Introduction
Modern research on sustainability of debt policies that applies statistical tests has started
with the contribution by Hamilton and Falvin (1986) who analyzed whether the series
of public debt in the USA contains a bubble term. Since then, a great many papers
have been written that try to answer the question of whether public debt policies can be
considered as sustainable. That question is not only of academic interest but it has also
a high practical relevance. Hence, if tests reach the conclusion that given debt policies
cannot be considered as sustainable, governments should undertake corrective actions in
order to prevent bankruptcy that goes along with hugh economic and social costs.
An important role in many of the studies on sustainability plays the interest rate, an
aspect that was pointed out by Wilcox (1989) for example. Considering that the inter-
temporal budget constraint of the government requires that the present value of public
debt asymptotically converges to zero, the role of the interest rate that is used in order
to discount the stream of public debt becomes immediately clear. However, future in-
terest rates are unknown. Therefore, tests have been conceived that reach results which
are independent of the interest rate. One such test is to analyze whether public deficits
inclusive of interest payments grow at most linearly, as suggested by Trehan and Walsh
(1991). If that property is holds, a given series of public debt is sustainable because any
time series that grows linearly converges to zero if it is discounted exponentially, provided
the real interest rate is positive. Another test proposed by Trehan and Walsh (1991)
is to analyze whether a quasi-difference of public debt is stationary and whether public
debt and primary surpluses are co-integrated. If the government debt is quasi-difference
stationary and public debt and primary surpluses are cointegrated, public debt is sus-
tainable. Hence, these two tests present alternatives where the outcome is independent
of the exact numerical value of the interest rate. A survey of analyses that have tested
for sustainability of debt policies can be found in Afonso (2005) or in Neck and Sturm
(2008).
Another test that has received great attention in the economics literature is the one
proposed by Bohn (1995, 1998). There, it is suggested to test whether the primary
surplus relative to GDP is a positive and at least linearly rising function of the debt
to GDP ratio. If that property holds, the ratio of public debt relative to GDP should
become a mean-reverting process so that the debt to GDP ratio remains bounded. This
test is very plausible because it has a nice economic intuition: if governments run into
debt today they have to take corrective actions in the future by increasing the primary
surplus. Otherwise, public debt will not be sustainable. Testing real world public debt
policies for that property, one can indeed find evidence that countries behave like that
(see for example Bohn, 1998, for the USA and Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2005,
Greiner et al., 2007, or Fincke and Greiner, 2008, for selected countries of the euro area).
In the rest of the paper we proceed as follows. In the next section we present the basic
equations that govern the accumulation of public debt and the assumptions we make in
analyzing which policies guarantee a sustainable debt policy. In section 3, we demonstrate
how governments have to set primary surpluses such that public debt remains sustainable
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and section 4, finally, concludes the paper.
2 Public debt, the debt to GDP ratio and the pri-
mary surplus
The evolution of the level of outstanding public debt in continuous time is governed by
the following equation
B˙(t) = r(t)B(t)− T (t) +G(t) = r(t)B(t)− S(t), (1)
with B(t) the level of public debt at time t, r(t) the interest rate on outstanding debt,
T (t) and G(t) give the tax revenue and public spending, respectively, and S(t) is the
primary surplus.1
The primary surplus can be controlled by the government by setting the taxes and
by determining public spending. There do exist types of spending that are beyond the
control of the government and, in addition, the government cannot set tax rates arbitrarily.
Nevertheless, the government disposes of at least some discretionary scope to set tax rates
and public spending.
An important variable in determining sustainable debt policies is played by the debt
to GDP ratio, b := B/Y , with Y denoting the GDP. The debt to GDP ratio evolves
according to
b˙ = b(r − g − s/b), (2)
where g denotes the growth rate of GDP and s := S/Y is the primary surplus relative to
GDP.
In our analysis of sustainable public debt policies we make the following two assump-
tions:2
• Assumption 1: 0 < ∆rg <∞, with ∆rg := r¯ − g¯.
• Assumption 2:
s(t) = f(b(t), Z(t)) = β(t)b(t) + α(t) = β¯ b(t) + α¯ ≤ sm,
with β¯ ∈ IR++, α¯ ∈ IR and sm < 1.
Our Assumption 1 states that the difference between the interest rate on public debt
and the GDP growth rate is strictly positive. It should be noted that this inequality
does not have to hold in each period but only on average. That is, this difference may be
negative for some time, however, on average it is positive over the whole time period. That
assumption is made because sustainability would not pose a problem if the difference was
negative. That holds since the government can grow out of debt when the GDP growth
1In the following, we delete the time argument t as long as no ambiguity arises.
2The bar over a coefficient (¯) denotes average values.
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rate exceeds the interest rate on public debt, meaning that it does not have to run primary
surpluses in order to pursue a sustainable debt policy.
Assumption 2 posits that the primary surplus relative to GDP is a function that
positively depends on the debt to GDP ratio and on other variables in the economy,
summarized by the vector Z(t). Since any non-linear function can be written as a linear
function with time-varying coefficients (cf. Granger, 2008) this function can be written in
a linear form with β(t) giving the reaction of the primary surplus to variations in public
debt, relative to GDP respectively. Further, with a time-varying reaction coefficient, it is
sufficient to consider the average value of that coefficient when analyzing sustainability
(see Greiner, 2011).
Finally, it should be noted that the primary surplus relative to GDP is bounded from
above, where sm denotes the upper bound. It must also be pointed out that this is not an
assumption but rather a consequence of national accounting. Since all expenditures of an
economy are financed ouf of GDP, they cannot exceed the latter. Assume for the moment
that public spending is equal to zero. Then, the primary surplus of the government is
identical to its total tax revenue and it becomes immediately clear that taxes cannot
exceed GDP so that the primary surplus is always smaller than GDP.
Given Assumption 2, the differential equations describing the evolution of public debt
and of the debt to GDP ratio can be rewritten as
B˙ = (r¯ − β¯)B − α¯ Y (3)
b˙ = b
(
r¯ − g¯ − β¯
)
− α¯. (4)
In the next section, we analyze under which conditions Assumption 2 guarantees a
sustainable debt policy and how the debt to GDP ratio evolves in this case.
3 Sustainable public debt
In this section we want to analyze under which conditions a positive reaction coefficient
β¯ guarantees that public debt remains sustainable. But, before we define a sustainable
debt policy in Definition 1
Definition 1 A sustainable debt policy is defined as a policy such that
lim
t→∞
e−rtB(t) = 0↔ B(0) =
∫
∞
0
e−rtS(t)dt .
According to Definition 1 a sustainable debt policy is, as usual, a debt policy such that the
present value of the public debt converges to zero asymptotically. The latter is equivalent
to the requirement that the level of the outstanding public debt equals the sum of the
present value of future primary surpluses.
Before we analyze under which conditions our Assumption 2 guarantees that public
debt remains sustainable, we first state that sustainability can never be achieved if the
ratio of public debt relative to GDP exceeds a certain threshold. This is the contents
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of Proposition 1 that states that there exists an upper bound for the debt to GDP ratio
beyond which a sustainable debt policy is excluded.
Proposition 1 A sustainable debt policy is excluded if the debt to GDP ratio exceeds the
critical value bcrit, with bcrit = sm
∫
∞
0
e−(∆rg)·tdt.
Proof: When the government sets the primary surplus to its maximum value, the evolution
of the public debt is given by
B˙ = r¯B − smY.
Solving that equation and multiplying both sides by e−r¯t, the present value of public debt
is obtained as
e−r¯tB(t) = B(0)− smY (0)
∫ t
0
e−(r¯−g¯)νdν.
The intertemporal budget constraint is fulfilled for limt→∞ e
−r¯tB(t) = 0 which implies
b(0) = sm
∫
∞
0
e−(r¯−g¯)νdν. If the initial debt to GDP ratio, b(0), exceeds sm
∫
∞
0
e−(r¯−g¯)νdν
sustainability of public debt is excluded. 2
Proposition 1 is an immediate consequence of the fact that the primary surplus relative
to GDP is bounded from above. Hence, once public debt relative to GDP becomes larger
than the critical threshold, bcrit, governments will not be able to pay back public debt.
The critical ratio of public debt relative to GDP is the larger, the higher the maximally
achievable primary surplus and the smaller the difference between the interest rate and
the GDP growth rate. It should be noted that we assume that neither the interest rate
nor the growth rate of GDP depend on the level of public debt that is rather questionable
for real world economies. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 would remain valid even if that
assumption was given up, as long as the difference between the interest rate and the GDP
growth rate is positive and finite.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 1 is that a permanently rising debt to GDP
ratio is not compatible with a sustainable debt policy. This is stated in the following
Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 A permanently rising debt to GDP ratio is not compatible with a sustainable
debt policy.
Proof: Follows immediately from Proposition 1. 2
The significance of Corollary 1 becomes clear when one considers that the public
debt to GDP ratio may rise even if the reaction coefficient β¯ is strictly positive. Then,
the government reacts to higher public debt by increasing its primary surplus, but, the
reaction is not sufficiently strong to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio. This leads to an ever
increasing debt ratio, a policy that is clearly unsustainable. The following proposition
states that in detail.
Proposition 2 If the government pursues a debt policy such that 0 < β¯ < ∆rg, public
debt becomes unsustainable.
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Proof: Solving equation (4) gives
b(t) =
(
b(0)−
α¯
∆rg − β¯
)
e(∆rg−β¯)t +
α¯
∆rg − β¯
.
For 0 < β¯ < ∆rg the debt to GDP ratio diverges to plus or minus infinity. 2
Proposition 2 demonstrates that public debt is unsustainable even if the reaction
coefficient is positive but smaller than the difference between the interest rate and the
GDP growth rate. The reason is that such a policy implies a permanently rising debt to
GDP ratio such that the critical debt to GDP ratio is reached sooner or later beyond which
a sustainable public debt policy is excluded. A permanently rising debt to GDP ratio
would require a permanently increasing primary surplus to GDP ratio for sustainability
which, however, is excluded because the primary surplus relative to GDP is bounded from
above. Hence, a positive reaction coefficient does not guarantee sustainability of public
debt. But even a positive reaction coefficient that exceeds the difference between interest
rate and the growth rate of GDP may not be sufficient to guarantee sustainability.
To see this, we first compute the limit of the debt to GDP ratio for the case when the
reaction coefficient exceeds the difference between interest rate and the growth rate. The
result is stated as Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 For β¯ > ∆rg > 0 the limit of the debt to GDP ratio is given by the expression
b⋆ := limt→∞ b(t) = α¯/(∆rg − β¯).
Proof: Follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 2. 2
Lemma 1 gives the limit of the debt to GDP ratio when the government chooses a
debt policy with a positive reaction coefficient that exceeds the difference between the
interest rate and the GDP growth rate. However, that policy is only feasible if that limit
is smaller than the critical debt ratio given in Proposition 1. If the limit, b⋆, exceeds the
critical debt to GDP ratio, bcrit, public debt becomes unsustainable once the actual debt
to GDP ratio becomes larger than the critical debt ratio. This holds because in this case
the upper bound of the debt to GDP ratio becomes binding before convergence has been
achieved.
Since both the critical debt to GDP ratio, bcrit, as well as the limit of the debt to
GDP ratio, b⋆, are determined endogenously, it is possible to formulate a condition with
respect to the parameters so that the public debt policy of the government is sustainable.
This is the contents of Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 For α¯ < 0, sustainability is given if and only if β¯ > ∆rg(1− α¯/sm) holds.
For α¯ > 0, sustainability is given if and only if β¯ > ∆rg holds.
Proof: For α¯ < 0, sustainability is given if and only if b⋆ < bcrit which is equivalent to
α∆rg > sm(∆rg − β¯) which gives β¯ > ∆rg(1− α¯/sm). For α¯ > 0, the inequality b
⋆ < bcrit
always holds so that it must be only assured that the debt to GDP ratio converges to a
finite value, which is given for β¯ > ∆rg. 2
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Proposition 3 shows that the reaction coefficient that guarantees sustainability of pub-
lic debt depends on the value of α¯ that reflects the discretionary scope of the government.
For α¯ < 0, that is when the government reduces the level of the primary surplus as GDP
rises, the reaction coefficient must exceed the difference between the interest rate and the
growth rate multiplied by a factor larger than one. That makes sense from an economic
point of view because a negative value of α¯ implies that governments do not care much
about public debt and tend to raise debt with a higher GDP so that sustainability can
only be achieved for a larger value of the reaction coefficient β¯. If the government raises
its primary surplus as GDP grows, i.e. for α¯ > 0, the reaction coefficient must only be
larger than the difference between the interest rate and the GDP growth rate because,
otherwise, the debt to GDP would become unbounded, thus, excluding a sustainable debt
policy, as shown in Proposition 2.
4 Conclusion
Testing how the primary surplus relative to GDP reacts, as the debt to GDP ratio rises, is
a powerful test that yields valuable insight concerning the fiscal behaviour of governments.
However, care must be taken in drawing conclusions with respect to the sustainability of
a given time series of public debt. In particular, a positive reaction coefficient alone does
not guarantee that the debt policy of a government is sustainable.
If the reaction coefficient is positive but smaller than the difference between the interest
rate and the GDP growth rate, the debt to GDP ratio becomes unbounded asymptotically,
thus, violating the inter-temporal budget constraint of the government. That holds beause
an unbounded debt to GDP ratio is not compatible with a sustainable debt policy since
it would require an unbounded primary surplus to GDP ratio that, however, is excluded
because the primary surplus cannot exceed the GDP of a country.
In case the reaction coefficient exceeds the difference between the interest rate and the
GDP growth rate, the debt to GDP ratio converges to a finite value. Nevertheless, the
limiting value, to which the debt ratio converges, may be larger than the critical debt to
GDP ratio, beyond which sustainability is excluded. This implies that even such a debt
policy is not sustainable. The major shortcoming of this test is that it does not take into
account that the ability of governments to achieve primary surpluses is limited so that
the primary surplus to GDP ratio is bounded from above.
Hence, testing the reaction of the primary surplus to variations in public debt gives
important information about the debt policy of governments and can, under certain con-
ditions, also be used to make statements about sustainability of public debt. Nevertheless,
that test should be accompanied by additional tests, such as testing for the cointegration
of public spending and revenues, for example. This holds, in particular, when the debt to
GDP ratio is characterized by a rising trend over time as in most European countries.
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